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This paper assesses whether partial exchange rate pass-through to trade prices
has important implications for the prospective adjustment of global external imbal-
ances. To address this question, we develop and estimate an open-economy DGE
model in which pass-through is incomplete due to the presence of local currency
pricing, distribution services, and a variable demand elasticity that leads to uctu-
ations in optimal markups. We nd that the overall magnitude of trade adjustment
is similar in a low and high pass-through world with more adjustment in a low pass-
world occurring through a larger response of the exchange rate and terms of trade
rather than real trade ows.
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11 Introduction
The U.S. current account de¯cit widened signi¯cantly over the past 15 years, reaching more
than 6 percent of GDP in 2006. This situation has raised concerns among policymakers about
how the de¯cit may unwind, with some observers arguing that the turnaround in the current
account de¯cit could be dramatic, triggering a large dollar depreciation and signi¯cant sectoral
adjustment along the way.1 Although the relative °exibility of U.S. labor markets and compet-
itiveness of the U.S. economy in general may help during the adjustment process, policymakers
worry that the presence of other frictions could hinder the adjustment of the trade balance.
One such often-mentioned friction is the well-documented lack of responsiveness of U.S.
import prices to movements in the exchange rate (i.e., low exchange rate pass-through). In
principle, low pass-through could considerably diminish the response of the trade balance to
shocks by muting the e®ects on trade prices. As a result, consumers would have less incentive
to alter their spending patterns, hampering the adjustment process. In this vein, Obstfeld and
Rogo® (2004) conjecture that, to engineer the necessary changes in relative prices, the dollar
depreciation consistent with eliminating the U.S. current account de¯cit would need to be much
larger in a world of low pass-through.
In this paper, we evaluate these arguments by examining the relationship between incom-
plete exchange rate pass-through to trade prices and the trade balance using a two-country,
DGE model. Our framework incorporates three complementary mechanisms that generate in-
complete pass-through to trade prices. First, pass through to import prices at the dock is low
because, as in Bergin and Feenstra (2001), Bouakez (2005), and Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson
(2006), ¯rms face a non-constant elasticity of demand, which leads to optimal markup varia-
tions that reduce the sensitivity of trade prices to changes in the exchange rate. Second, the
presence of nominal rigidities combined with local currency pricing also reduces the extent of
pass-through at the dock. Finally, following Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003), we introduce
1 See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000b), Edwards (2005), or Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2004). For
a more benign view, see Backus, Henriksen, Lambert, and Telmer (2006). For other explanations of the large
U.S. current account de¯cits, see Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2006), Engel and Rogers (2006), Faruqee,
Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti (2005), and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007).
1a distribution sector intensive in local non-tradables to lower pass through to import prices at
the retail level. By estimating our model, we show that each of these mechanisms is important
in accounting for key features of U.S. data.
Our main ¯nding is that the extent of pass-through does not signi¯cantly alter the response
of the nominal trade balance to shocks. In a low pass-through world, the sensitivity of the
real economy to changes in the exchange rate is muted, which inhibits external adjustment.
In addition, the response of the exchange rate to shocks is ampli¯ed in a low pass-through
environment, which helps engender more nominal adjustment. For our benchmark estimates,
we ¯nd that these two e®ects largely o®set so that the nominal trade balance responds by
roughly the same magnitude in a low and high pass-through environment. However, the forces
underlying movements in the trade balance are very di®erent with more adjustment in a low
pass-world occurring through a larger response of the exchange rate and terms of trade rather
than real trade °ows.
We show that this result is not very sensitive to the relative importance of the three features
that account for low pass-through, but it does depend critically on the value of the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods. Our benchmark estimate of this elasticity is
just below one, and we ¯nd that a low pass-through environment only inhibits nominal trade
adjustment when this elasticity is much higher in both the short and long-run. While such high
elasticities | in the range of 6 to 15 | are typically found in studies examining the response
of trade volumes to permanent tari® changes over long horizons, such high elasticities are more
di±cult to justify over shorter horizons, as trade volumes appear relatively unresponsive to
trade prices at business cycle frequencies. We modify our benchmark model to incorporate
costs of adjusting imports as in Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) or Engel and Wang (2007)
so that the model is consistent with both sets of evidence. In this case, as in the benchmark
model, the response of the nominal trade balance to shocks is roughly the same in the low and
high pass-through worlds.
All told, we view our results as providing some comfort that trade adjustment can still
occur even in economies facing relatively unresponsive trade prices, albeit via larger exchange
2rate depreciation and terms of trade movements than higher trade volumes. Indeed, recent
evidence indicates that pass-through to U.S. import prices is well below unity and has been
declining. For instance, Marazzi and Sheets (2007) report that pass-through to \core" import
prices (i.e., excluding computers, semiconductors, and oil) fell from 50 percent in the 1970s and
1980s to roughly 20 percent during the past decade. Recent analyses by the BIS (2005) and
the IMF (2005) have found broadly similar results. Campa and Goldberg (2005) do not ¯nd a
decline in pass-through to import prices, but nevertheless conclude that it remains quite low
at approximately 40 percent.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our open-
economy model. We then describe our approach for estimating key model parameters and
present our main results. In doing so, we conduct extensive sensitivity analysis, showing that
our results are robust to di®erent monetary policy rules and to variations in the relative impor-
tance of the three features that account for incomplete pass-through. Finally, we o®er a brief
conclusion.
2 The Model
Our model consists of a home and a foreign economy. These two economies have isomorphic
structures so in our exposition we focus on describing only the domestic economy. The domestic
economy consists of households, producers of an aggregate tradable and non-tradable good,
and a government sector. Each country in e®ect produces both an aggregate tradable and
non-tradable good, although we adopt a monopolistically-competitive framework to rationalize
price stickiness of both non-tradable and tradable prices.
We introduce three mechanisms into the model to reduce the sensitivity of import prices to
changes in the exchange rate. First, we allow for a distribution sector as in Burstein, Neves,
and Rebelo (2003) that requires a signi¯cant non-tradable component and lowers the sensitivity
of retail import prices to exchange rate movements. Second, as in Betts and Devereux (1999),
we assume that trade prices are sticky in local currency terms. Finally, as in Gust, Leduc,
3and Vigfusson (2006), we use Kimball (1995)-type demand curves so that a ¯rm's export price
depends on the prices of its competitors, giving rise to optimal markup variation that induces
incomplete pass-through.
2.1 Households
















where Ct denotes consumption, and Lt denotes labor hours. The discount factor ¯ satis¯es 0 <
¯ < 1, and Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t. A
household faces a °ow budget constraint in period t which states that its expenditures and net
accumulation of ¯nancial assets must equal its disposable income:
PtCt + PtIt +
Z
s




¡ etBFt = WtLt + RKtKt + ­t ¡ Tt: (2)
A household's disposable income consists of its labor income (WtLt), income from renting capital
to ¯rms (RKtKt), and an aliquot share of the pro¯ts of the ¯rms located in the home country
(­t). Households also pay lump-sum taxes (Tt) and purchase consumption and investment (It)
at price, Pt. A household's investment augments capital according to:
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It: (3)
We assume that a household can engage in frictionless trading of a complete set of contingent
claims with other domestic households. We denote »t;t+1 as the price of an asset that pays one
unit of domestic currency in a particular state of nature at date t + 1, while BDt+1 represents
the quantity of such claims purchased by a household at time t.
While asset markets are complete within a country, we assume that trade in international
assets is restricted to a non-state contingent nominal bond. Accordingly, in equation (2), BFt+1
represents the quantity of a non-state contingent asset purchased at time t that pays one unit
of foreign currency in the subsequent period, and P ¤
Bt is the foreign currency price of the bond.
4We follow Turnovsky (1985) and assume there is an intermediation cost Ábt paid by households
in the home country for purchases of foreign bonds, which is necessary to ensure that net foreign
assets are stationary in equilibrium.2 More speci¯cally, the intermediation costs depend on the










In every period t, a household maximizes the utility functional (1) with respect to consump-
tion, investment, the end-of-period capital stock, labor, holdings of domestic contingent claims,
and holdings of the international asset subject to its budget constraint (2) and the evolution of
capital (3). In doing so, a household takes as given prices and aggregate quantities such as the
aggregate net foreign asset position.
2.2 Final Good Production
The economy's ¯nal good (At) is used for consumption, investment, and government consump-
tion. This ¯nal good is produced by perfectly competitive ¯rms who purchase a non-traded
good, ANt, and traded good, ATt, at prices PNt and P R
Tt. (We use an \R" superscript to denote
the retail price of the traded good to distinguish it from its wholesale price PTt.) The ¯nal
















where Á and 1 ¡ Á are the weights on the non-traded and traded goods and
1+½a
½a denotes the
constant elasticity between these goods.
A representative ¯nal goods producer sells its good to households and the government at
price Pt and chooses its purchases of non-traded and traded goods to maximize its pro¯ts:
maxPtAt ¡ PNtANt ¡ P
R
TtATt; (6)
subject to equation (5).
2 This intermediation cost is asymmetric, as foreign households do not face these costs. Rather, they collect
pro¯ts on the monopoly rents associated with these intermediation costs. As discussed in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003), this way of closing the model delivers similar dynamics to other alternative approaches.
52.3 Non-traded Good Production
The economy's non-traded good is produced by perfectly competitive ¯rms who combine a
continuum of di®erentiated products, ANt(i), i 2 [0;1], according to the demand aggregator,
R 1
0 DN(ANt(i))di = 1. We follow Dotsey and King (2005) and assume that the functional form


















A representative non-traded goods producer chooses ANt and its purchases of di®erentiated





subject to equation (7) taking PNt and the prices of the di®erentiated goods, PNt(i), as given.



































From equation (9), it is clear that with º 6= 0, the demand curve has a Dixit-Stiglitz component
as well as an additive linear term. The presence of this additive linear term gives rise to a
variable elasticity of substitution (VES) in which the elasticity depends on PNt(i) relative to
the price of a ¯rm's competitors, ¹ PNt. In particular, as in Kimball (1995), when º > 0, the
demand elasticity can be expressed as an increasing function of a ¯rm's relative price. This
variable demand elasticity gives rise to complementarities in price setting and has proven useful
in the sticky price literature, because it reduces a ¯rm's incentive to change its price, improving
6the ability of these models to account for in°ation dynamics.3. Another attractive property
of this demand aggregator is that it nests Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in which the elasticity of
demand is constant when º = 0:
2.4 Traded Goods Production
The economy's traded good is produced by perfectly competitive ¯rms who combine a contin-
uum of domestically-produced di®erentiated products, AHt(i), i 2 [0;1], and imported goods,











































Our demand aggregator is similar to the one in Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), who ex-
tend the Dotsey and King (2005) aggregator to an international environment.4 Similar to the
aggregator for non-traded goods, this aggregator also has a variable elasticity for º 6= 0 and
a constant elasticity for º = 0. The parameter ! can be thought of as indexing the share of
imports in traded goods production.
This aggregator allows the elasticity of substitution between a home and foreign good to
di®er from the demand elasticity for two home goods. When º = 0, this demand aggregator
simpli¯es to one used by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), whose aggregator can be thought
as the combination of a Dixit-Stiglitz and Armington aggregator. In equations (12)-(14), °
in°uences the elasticity of substitution between two home brands. The elasticity of substitution
3 See, for example, Dotsey and King (2005), Eichenbaum and Fischer (2007) and Guerrieri, Gust, and
L¶ opez-Salido (2008).
4 See Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006) for a discussion of the properties of this demand aggregator.
7between a home and a foreign good is in°uenced by both ° and ½. This property gives the
model the °exibility to match empirical estimates of average, economy-wide markups and the
responsiveness of aggregate trade °ows to relative price changes.
A representative traded goods producer chooses its purchases of di®erentiated imports and








subject to equations (12)-(14). In the above, PTt denotes the wholesale price of the traded good,
which di®ers from the retail price P R
Tt due to the presence of a perfectly competitive distribution
sector. More speci¯cally, we follow Erceg and Levin (1996), Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003),
and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008a) by assuming that bringing one unit of the traded good
to the ¯nal goods producers requires ´ units of the non-traded good. Consequently, the retail
price of the traded good re°ects a non-traded component, since:
P
R
Tt = PTt + ´PNt: (16)
An important implication of this distribution sector is that exchange rate pass-through of retail
import prices will be lower than for wholesale import prices, since distribution services make
up an important component of the retail price.
Pro¯t maximization by a representative traded goods producer implies that its demand for










































8where PHt is a wholesale price index for domestic goods de¯ned similarly to equation (18).
Similar to the demand curve for non-traded good, the demand for an imported good, equa-
tion (17) has an additive term that leads to an elasticity of demand for imported good i that
depends on PFt(i) relative to the prices of its competitors. When the absolute value of the de-
mand elasticity is increasing in a ¯rm's relative price, exchange rate pass-through to wholesale
import prices will be incomplete.
Pro¯t maximization implies a similar expression for the demand of AHt(i) expressed as a
function of PHt(i), ¹ PTt, and PHt, the wholesale price index for domestically-produced goods. It

















2.5 Intermediate Traded Goods Producers
The producer of traded good i is a monopolistically competitive ¯rm, which sells its good to
producers of the aggregate traded good located at home and abroad. A producer utilizes capital




where ZTt is a shock to the level of technology in the traded goods sector. Since capital and
labor are completely mobile within a country, all intermediate traded goods producers have
have identical marginal cost per unit of output, MCTt.
We consider two alternatives for a traded good ¯rm's price setting decisions. In the ¯rst
case, we assume that markets are segmented and a ¯rm sets di®erent prices at home and abroad
according to Calvo-style contracts. We follow Betts and Devereux (1999) among others and
specify the contract price in local currency terms, and call this ¯rst alternative local currency
pricing (LCP). In the second case, we assume that ¯rms practice producer currency pricing.
92.5.1 Local Currency Pricing/Pricing to Market
For its domestic price setting decision, ¯rm i faces the constant probability 1¡µH of being able
to re-optimize its price, and we assume this probability is independent across time, ¯rms, and






H [PHt (i) ¡ MCTt+j]AHt+j(i); (22)
taking Ãt+j, MCTt+j, and its demand schedule as given. In the above, Ãt+j is the stochastic
















AHt+j(i) = 0; (23)

















Domestic markup °uctuations for the traded good re°ect the presence of nominal rigidities
and a variable demand elasticity. To separate out these two sources of markup °uctuations, it
is convenient to de¯ne the desired domestic markup (i.e. the markup in the absence of nominal














where the lower case variables denote relative prices (i.e., pHt(i) =
PHt(i)
PHt and ¹ pTt =
¹ PTt
PHt). For
º > 0, the elasticity of demand increases when pHt(i) increases and as a result a ¯rm will lower
its desired markup. In addition, a decrease in relative import prices pFt =
PFt
PHt lowers ¹ pTt (see
equation 19), raising the elasticity of demand and inducing a ¯rm to lower its desired markup.6
5 For convenience, we have suppressed all of the state indices. In the household problem, we de¯ne »t;t+1
to be the price in period t of a claim that pays one unit of the home currency if the speci¯ed state occurs in
period t + 1. The corresponding element of Ãt;t+1 equals »t;t+1 divided by the probability that the speci¯ed
state occurs.
6 This reasoning assumes that ° > 1 > ½, which is true for our benchmark estimates. More speci¯cally, we
require
º½(°¡1)
°¡½ > 0 in the neighborhood of non-stochastic steady state for the pricing decisions to be strategic
complements according to Woodford (2003), who de¯nes pricing decisions to be strategic complements if an
increase in the prices charged for other goods increases a ¯rm's own optimal price.
10Thus, a traded goods ¯rm will change its desired price in response to changes in both domestic
and foreign competition.
The ¯rst-order approximation of equation (23) can be written as:
^ ¼Ht = ¯Et^ ¼Ht+1 + ·H
h






where ^ ¼Ht is domestic traded goods price in°ation expressed as a log deviation from steady state
and ·H =
(1¡¯µH)(1¡µH)
µH . The composite parameter ·H =
(1¡¯µH)(1¡µH)
µH in°uences the sensitivity
of in°ation to marginal cost and depends on the degree of nominal rigidities.
The composite parameter ª re°ects variations in desired markups associated with compe-






In the above, ¹ = 1
°+(1¡°)º denotes the economy's steady state markup. A higher value of º
increases ª, which implies that a ¯rm's desired price is less sensitive to marginal cost and more
sensitive to the prices of its competitors. Consequently, a higher value of º is also associated
with reduced sensitivity of non-traded goods in°ation to real marginal cost. The sensitivity
of domestic in°ation to relative import prices also depends on the steady state elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods (²T =
½
(½¡°)(1¡º) > 0) relative to the steady
state elasticity of two home brands (² = 1
(1¡°)(1¡º) > 0). In particular, a lower elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods reduces the sensitivity of domestic traded goods
in°ation to foreign competition. Moreover, the degree of trade openness (!) also in°uences the
extent to which foreign competition in°uences domestic price in°ation.
Under the assumption of LCP, domestic ¯rms set prices for their goods in units of foreign
currency according to Calvo contracts with constant probability 1 ¡ µ¤
H of being able to re-









Ht (i) ¡ MCTt+j]A
¤
Ht+j(i); (28)
11taking the exchange rate (et+j) denominated in units of home currency per units of foreign
currency, MCTt+j, and its demand schedule, A¤
Ht+j(i), as given. (We use a \¤" to denote





















Ht+j(i) = 0; (29)























Both the variable demand elasticity and the fact that prices are sticky in local currency terms
will in°uence the responsiveness of foreign import prices (P ¤
Ht(i)) to movements in the exchange
rate. A ¯rst-order approximation of equation (29) yields:
^ ¼
¤






(1 ¡ ª)( ^ MCTt ¡ ^ et ¡ ^ P
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H . From this expression, we can see that the sensitivity of foreign import
prices to the exchange rate will be in°uenced by the degree of nominal rigidities through its
e®ect on ·¤
H and the responsiveness of a domestic ¯rm's desired foreign price to the prices of
its competitors through its e®ect on ª. Since in the foreign market a domestic ¯rm competes
with foreign tradable goods producers, foreign import price in°ation depends on the price of





Ht) Because a home
exporter does not want its price to deviate too far from its foreign competitors, an exporter
will reduce its desired markup in response to a shock that appreciates the exchange rate and
increases its marginal cost. In this way, pass-through of exchange-rate changes to import prices
can be incomplete even in the absence of nominal price rigidities.
A novel feature of either equations (26) or (31) is that they can be used to separately
identify variations in markups associated with nominal rigidities (i.e., µH, µ¤
H) from variations
in markups associated with the variable demand elasiticity (i.e., ª). Unfortunately, achieving
such identi¯cation is not possible in closed economy models with both sticky prices and a
12Kimball-type aggregator or in open-economy variants such as Bouakez (2005).7 This lack of
identi¯cation has made it di±cult to estimate Kimball demand curves, and estimates such as in
Bouakez (2005) are derived by holding the Calvo price setting parameter constant. Instead, we
are able to jointly estimate these parameters, and in our empirical approach discussed below
do so for ª and µF, the Calvo price setting parameter for foreign exporters.8
2.5.2 Producer Currency Pricing
For our second alternative, we assume that a traded goods ¯rm practices producer currency
pricing (PCP). In this case, a ¯rm sets one price for its good for the world market, PHt(i),
in terms of their own currency. This price is set according to Calvo-style contracts with the
probability 1 ¡ µH of being able to re-optimize their price. Since the law of one price holds in







According to equation (32), holding domestic prices ¯xed, an exporter will change its price one-
for-one with a given percentage change in the exchange rate so that pass-through of exchange
rate changes to foreign import prices will be complete.













taking marginal cost as well as the home and foreign demand schedules as given. The ¯rst-order



























7 Our aggregator also has the attractive feature of implying similar behavior for the desired prices of inter-
national goods as the game-theoretic models of Atkeson and Burstein (2005) and Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston
(2002). See the appendix of Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006) for a discussion.
8 See, Guerrieri, Gust, and L¶ opez-Salido (2008), for an alternative application and estimation strategy that
exploits the fact that these two sources of markup variations can be separately identi¯ed via equation (26).
13A ¯rst-order approximation of this equation yields:
^ ¼Ht = ¯Et^ ¼Ht+1 + ·H
h
(1 ¡ ª)( ^ MCTt ¡ ^ PHt) + ª!(1 ¡ !)
²T
²





2.6 Intermediate Non-Traded Goods Production
The producer of non-traded good i is a monopolistically competitive ¯rm, which sells its good
to producers of the aggregate non-traded good. Firm i in the non-traded sector utilizes capital




where ZNt is a shock to the level of technology in the non-traded sector. Intermediate good
¯rms purchase capital and labor from the economy's households in perfectly competitive factor
markets, and we assume that capital and labor are completely mobile within a country. Thus,
all non-traded goods producers have identical marginal cost per unit of output, MCNt.
We assume that a non-traded ¯rm sets its price according to Calvo-style contracts with







N [PNt (i) ¡ MCNt+j]ANt+j(i); (37)

















ANt+j(i) = 0; (38)













A ¯rst-order approximation of equation (38) yields:
^ ¼Nt = ¯Et^ ¼Nt+1 + ·N(1 ¡ ª)( ^ MCNt ¡ ^ PNt); (40)
where ^ ¼Nt is non-traded goods price in°ation expressed as a log deviation from steady state and
^ MCNt¡ ^ PNt represents real marginal cost in units of non-traded goods, and ·N =
(1¡¯µN)(1¡µN)
µN .
142.7 The Government and Monetary Policy
Some of the ¯nal good is purchased by the government so that At can be interpreted as total
absorption:
At = Ct + It + Gt: (41)
We assume that government purchases (Gt) follow an exogenous, stochastic process and do not
directly a®ect the utility function of the representative household. The government's budget
is balanced every period which implies that lump-sum taxes are equal to nominal government
purchases.9
We assume that monetary policy follows an interest rate rule:
^ it = °¼^ ¼t + °y^ yt; (42)
where the above variables are expressed in logarithmic deviation from steady state. Hence,
^ it denotes the (gross) quarterly nominal interest rate expressed as a log-deviation from steady
state, and ¼t = Pt
Pt¡1 is the quarterly rate of in°ation. The interest rate rule also includes the log
deviation of output from potential output, where potential output is de¯ned as the domestic
economy's level of output in the absence of sticky prices.
3 Method of Moments Estimation
In this section we discuss our procedure for assigning values to the model's parameters. Our
approach involves estimating key model parameters that in°uence exchange rate pass-through
and the trade balance using a generalized method of moments procedure, while calibrating
other parameters.
9 The assumption of a balanced budget is not restrictive given the Ricardian nature of the model, and the
availability of lump-sum taxes.
153.1 Calibrated Parameter Values
We solve our general equilibrium model by assigning numerical values to its parameters and
log-linearizing the equations around the steady state.10 For simplicity, we choose the model
parameters to be the same across countries so we only discuss the parameter values for the
home country.
We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency by setting ¯ = (1:03)¡0:25 and ± = 0:025.
The utility function parameter Â is set to 1, which implies a Frisch labor supply elasticity of
1, while Â0 is chosen so that the steady state level of hours worked is normalized to unity. We
choose a small value for the ¯nancial intermediation cost, Áb = 0:0001, which is necessary to
ensure that net foreign assets are stationary.
The Cobb-Douglas production function parameter ® = 0:4 in both the traded and non-
traded sectors. We set the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods
(
1+½a
½a ) to be 0.74, based on the estimates of Mendoza (1991) for industrial countries. The
share parameter Á was set equal to 0.2, which implies that the non-traded good accounts for
58 percent of absorption, in line with U.S. data. Following Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003),
we choose ´ = 1 so that the non-traded component of the retail price of the traded good is 50
percent. We set ! = 0:25 so that the economy's import share is about 10 percent.
For the degree of nominal rigidities for non-tradable prices and domestic tradable prices at
home and abroad, we choose µN = µH = µ¤
F = 0:75, which implies that these prices are re-
optimized once a year on average.11 These values are broadly consistent with the micro evidence
of Nakamura and Steinsson (2007), who ¯nd a median duration of non-sale prices of 8-11 months
using prices for both consumers and producer's ¯nished goods.12 For our benchmark results,
10 To obtain the reduced-form solution of the model, we use the numerical algorithm of Anderson and Moore
(1985), which provides an e±cient implementation of the method proposed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
11 Although these parameters are separately identi¯able in our model, we choose not to estimate them.
Instead, we exploit this feature of our model and jointly estimate ª with µF, the foreign exporter's Calvo
pricing parameter, to keep the focus of the paper on international price-setting behavior in the model.
12 The ¯ndings of Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) are also in line with earlier micro studies surveyed in Taylor
(1999). In contrast, Bils and Klenow (2004) ¯nd a much higher frequency of price adjustment using micro data
on consumer prices. The lower frequency of price changes in Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) largely re°ects
that they exclude temporary sales in measuring price changes, while Bils and Klenow (2004) include sales.
16we assume that the a foreign exporter sets its price in local currency and a home exporter sets
its price in producer currency based on the empirical work of Gopinath and Rigobon (2006)
and Goldberg and Tille (2006) for the United States. In addition, in our results we compare
this setup to symmetric environments of local currency pricing and producer currency pricing.
For the monetary policy rule, following Taylor (1993), we set °¼ = 1:5 and °y = 0:5=4.




tg. To cut down on the number of shock processes that we need to
estimate, we assume that there is just one aggregate technology shock in each economy (i.e.,
Zt = ZNt = ZTt and Z¤
t = Z¤
Nt = Z¤
Tt). We specify that the technology and government
spending shocks in both countries follow a ¯rst-order autoregressive process with each shock in-
dependent from another. Thus, both the aggregate technology shock and government spending
shock are uncorrelated across countries.
For government spending, we set the autoregressive coe±cient, ½g = 0:98, and the standard
deviation of the shock, ¾g = 0:016. These values are consistent with the regression estimates of
Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005), who use quarterly NIPA data on government consumption
and investment from 1958-2002. We set the steady state ratio of government spending to output
(g) in each economy to 0.18.
3.2 Estimation Procedure
We set the parameters for the technology shock, ½Z, and ¾Z, the average contract duration
of foreign export prices, µF, and the demand curve parameters ½ and º as part of a moment
matching exercise. Our estimation procedure is to choose the vector of model parameters,
¡ = [µF;º;½;¾Z;½Z]0, to minimize:
(^ Àt ¡ f(¡))^ V
¡1
T (^ Àt ¡ f(¡))
0;
where ^ Àt is a vector of point estimates of moments from U.S. data and ^ V
¡1
T is a matrix whose
diagonal contains the (asymptotic) estimates of the underlying sampling variance for these
moments and o®-diagonal elements are zero. We now describe our choice of moments.
17Since the parameters µF and º have important implications for the degree of exchange rate
pass-through to the home country's import prices, we use a measure of pass-through to estimate
these parameters. To evaluate the sensitivity of import prices to exchange rate movements at







P denotes the relative import price of the home country, and q = eP¤
P is the real
exchange rate. This statistic takes into account the correlation between the two series ½(pF;q)
as well as the volatility of import prices ¾pF relative to exchange rate volatility ¾q and can be
derived as the estimate from a univariate least squares regression of the real exchange rate on
the relative import price. To separately identify variations in markups due to local currency
pricing (i.e., µF) and variations due to the variable demand elasticity (i.e., º), we compute
¯(pF;q) at both a low and a high frequency. Intuitively, this more complete description of
pass-through dynamics allows us to identify these two sources of incomplete pass-through to
import prices at the dock, because over longer time horizons, the nominal rigidities become less
important for accounting for low exchange rate pass-through.
The ¯rst column of Table 1 reports ¯(pF;q) based on U.S. data at periodicities between 2
and 8 quarters (i.e., high frequencies) and between 20 and 40 quarters (i.e., low frequencies)
using the band pass ¯lter of Baxter and King (1995).13 U.S. import prices are less sensitive
to real exchange rate movements at high frequencies than at low frequencies: ¯H(pF;q) = 0:29
at periodicities between 2 and 8 quarters and ¯L(pF;q) = 0:58 at periodicities between 20 and
40 quarters.14 (We use superscripts to denote the frequency of the statistic so that an \L"
indicates low frequencies, \H" indicates high frequencies, and \BC" indicates business cycle
frequencies.)
13 We use quarterly data over the sample period, 1973:Q1-2007:Q3. All of our data are from the U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts except for the real exchange rate. For this series, we use the Federal Reserve's
real e®ective exchange rate. Our import price series excludes fuel prices, and we use the PCE de°ator excluding
food and energy as our measure of consumer price in°ation.
14 Our results that import prices are less sensitive in the short run than long run to the exchange rate is
consistent with a large empirical literature (e.g., Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Marazzi and Sheets (2007))
that estimates pass-through to import prices at the dock.





where ¼ denotes consumer price in°ation. This statistic measures the sensitivity of consumer
price in°ation to exchange rate movements and is in°uenced by µF and º, which have important
e®ects on exchange rate pass-through to wholesale import prices. It is also in°uenced by ´,
which determines the size of the distribution sector and a®ects the extent of pass-through to
retail import prices. The last entry in the ¯rst column of Table 2 shows that at business cycle
frequencies (i.e., periodicities of 8 to 32 quarters) ¯(¼;q) is quite low, less than 2 percent,
consistent with the evidence presented in McCallum and Nelson (2000).
In our analysis, an important determinant of the response of the trade balance to shocks is
the steady state elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, ²T, which in turn
in°uences the responsiveness of real trade °ows to relative trade prices (i.e., the the trade price





A denotes real imports scaled by real domestic absorption, At. This
statistic measures the responsiveness of real imports to changes in the relative price of imports,
while controlling for changes in activity (i.e., absorption). As is well known, there is a debate in
the empirical literature regarding the size of the trade price elasticity. Approaches emphasizing
the behavior of trade at business cycle frequencies tend to ¯nd relatively low estimates; studies
of trade reforms highlighting the response of trade over longer time spans typically ¯nd much
higher values.15 To estimate ²T, we included ¯(
AF
A ;pF) at only a relatively low frequency (i.e.,
periodicities between 20 and 40 quarters) in our estimation procedure, though we still use the
higher frequency moment to evaluate the model's ¯t. The ¯rst column of Table 1 shows that
based on U.S. data ¯L(
AF
A ;pF) = ¡0:61 for periodicities between 20 and 40 quarters, and this
statistic is even lower at a higher frequency.16
The remaining two parameters that we estimate are the standard deviation, ¾Z, and the
¯rst-order autocorrelation, ½Z of the aggregate technology shock. To estimate these parameters,
15 For a discussion of the estimates of trade price elasticities, see Engel and Wang (2007) and Ruhl (2005)
and the references therein.
16 We use NIPA data to apply standard chain-aggregation routines to construct the real absorption series.
19we use the standard deviation of GDP, ¾BC(Y ), and the ¯rst-order autocorrelation of GDP,
½BC(Y;Y¡1), computed at business cycle frequencies. The values of these statistics are reported
in Table 2.
We condition our estimates on a value of the demand curve parameter ° that implies a
steady state markup of 20 percent (i.e., ¹ = 1:2). Since ¹ = ²
²¡1, the steady state elasticity of
substitution between home traded or non-traded goods in the economy (²) is six. Finally, we
note that the three demand curve parameters, f½;°;ºg, uniquely determine f²T;¹;ªg. In our
discussion, we focus on the estimates of f²T;¹;ªg, since they are more economically meaningful.
3.3 Estimated Parameters
Table 3 reports the results from our estimation procedure. Our estimated value of ª is 0.85,
which implies a demand elasticity that is far from constant (i.e., ª = 0) so that ¯rms vary
their desired markups considerably in response to changes in competition. In particular, a ¯rm
will raise its desired price only 0.15 percent in response to a 1 percent idiosyncratic change in
its marginal cost, holding all else equal, since it lowers its desired markup in order to keep its
desired price relatively constant compared to those of its competitors. Our estimate of ª is
higher than the 0.73 estimate of Guerrieri, Gust, and L¶ opez-Salido (2008) and 0.67 estimate
of Dossche, Heylen, and den Poel (2007), but considerably lower than the 0.96 estimate of
Bouakez (2005) and 0.98 calibrated value of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).17
We estimate µF = 0:5, which implies that foreign exporters re-optimize their prices every
two quarters on average. This estimate is lower than the 11 month average duration of price
changes for U.S. import prices found by Gopinath and Rigobon (2006). However, as discussed
below, our results regarding the relationship between the nominal trade balance and exchange
rate pass-through are robust to higher values of µF.
17 Our estimate of ª also has important implications for how much a ¯rm's demand elasticity varies. For our
estimated value of ª, a 2 percent increase in the desired price of good i reduces the relative demand for good i
by 16 percent and 2.3 percent increase reduces demand by 19 percent. In contrast, the value of ª = 0:98 used
by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) implies that a 2 (2.3) percent increase in a ¯rm's price lead to a 78
(100) percent fall in demand. Thus, relative to their calibration, our estimated demand curve appears quite
reasonable.
20The estimated value of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, ²T is
0.8, which is similar to that estimated by Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008b) in a model with
distribution services. It is interesting to note that our estimate remains near unity even though
we used information at relatively long horizons (5 to 10 years) to estimate this parameter.
However, since estimates from the literature following permanent changes in tari®s are typically
much higher { ranging from 6 to 15 { we also consider the sensitivity of our results to higher
values for ²T as well as allowing for an alternative speci¯cation in which the long-run elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods can di®er from the short-run elasticity.
4 Results
In this section, we evaluate the empirical ¯t of our benchmark model and use it to examine
how the trade balance responds to di®erent shocks in high and low pass-through environments.
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to di®erent mechanisms for inducing incomplete
exchange rate pass-through to import prices, alternative monetary policy rules, and alternative
assumptions regarding the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
4.1 Empirical Fit of the Benchmark Economy
Table 1 presents some key trade statistics for the United States at high and low frequen-
cies and the corresponding predictions from our estimated model under the column labeled
\Benchmark". The model matches the measure of pass-through, ¯(pF;q); at both low and high
frequencies. Our assumption that domestic exporters set prices in producer currency implies,
as in the data, that U.S. export prices denominated in dollars are insensitive to exchange rate
movements. (Alternatively, there is high pass-through of exchange rate changes to foreign-
denominated import prices of U.S. goods.) Our estimation procedure performs reasonably well
in matching the responsiveness of U.S. imports to changes in relative import prices at a low
frequency. At high frequency, the model predicts a higher point estimate for this moment,
though once one takes into account the sampling uncertainty in the data, the departure is not
21large. Overall, we view our model as being consistent with some key empirical correlations of
trade prices and quantities.
We also report the business cycle properties of the benchmark model in Table 2, which shows
that the benchmark model accounts for roughly 45 percent of the volatility of the nominal
trade balance, even though in order to keep the analysis tractable we have abstracted from
the fact that trade is more intensive in durable than nondurable goods.18 In the benchmark
model, the terms of trade are also less volatile than the real exchange rate, re°ecting in part
movements in the relative price of non-traded goods (see Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008b)
for a discussion). Moreover, a worsening of the terms of trade is associated with a depreciation
of the real exchange rate, an empirical feature emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000a).
However, the correlation in the model is more pronounced than in the data. Finally, a standard
shortcoming of our benchmark model is the relatively low volatility of the real exchange rate,
which is only 1.6 times as volatile as output.
4.2 The Relationship Between Pass-Through and the Trade Balance
To what extent does a low pass-through environment a®ect the response of the nominal trade
balance to shocks hitting the economy? To address this question, we consider the e®ects of
various shocks on the trade balance for three alternatives assumptions that a®ect the degree
of exchange rate pass-through at the border. Our ¯rst alternative is the benchmark version of
the model in which pass-through is asymmetric: low import price pass-through in the home
country and high import price pass-through in the foreign country. This asymmetry re°ects
that foreign exporters price to market and home exporters engage in producer currency pricing.
We compare this benchmark scenario to the case in which pass-through is low in both countries
labeled \Low ERPT", as both home and foreign producers price to market, and to the case in
18 Introducing this feature would tend to increase the variability of trade variables in the model. See, Boileau
(1999), Engel and Wang (2007) and Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2008) for a discussion. Our results regarding the
relationship between import price pass-through and the trade balance are robust to the trade speci¯cation used
in Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2008) in which investment goods are more trade intensive than consumption
goods. To keep the model's pricing behavior relatively tractable, we choose to follow Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland (1994) and work with our absorption-based trade speci¯cation in which the shares of imports in ¯nal
consumption and investment goods are the same.
22which pass-through is high in both countries labeled \High ERPT", as both home and foreign
producers engage in producer currency pricing.
Before discussing the e®ects of various shocks on the trade balance for these scenarios, it
is helpful to ¯rst make a few comments about their empirical relevance. As shown in Table 1
under the column \Low ERPT" a symmetric framework of local currency pricing and pricing
to market implies that export prices are overly sensitive to movements in the real exchange rate
relative to the data. Moreover, as emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000a) in their critique
of local currency pricing, Table 2 shows that an exchange rate depreciation is also associated
with a counterfactual terms of trade improvement in this case. Finally, in the scenario with
both home and foreign producers engaging in producer currency pricing (not shown), the model
implies that import prices are overly responsive to exchange rate movements. Although these
two cases do not match the data as well as our benchmark case, they are useful for illustrating
the di®erences that arise in an environment in which pass-through at the border is high as
opposed to low.
Figure 1 shows the e®ects of a decrease in home government spending on the nominal trade
balance for the benchmark scenario (the dotted blue line).19 A fall in government spending
directly lowers domestic absorption (i.e., Ct+It+Gt) as well as indirectly through investment,
as a decline in hours worked reduces the marginal product of capital. The real exchange rate
depreciates and the terms of trade deteriorate after the shock. Both the decline in absorption
and the real exchange rate depreciation contribute to improvements in the real and nominal
trade balance. Over a longer horizon, the real exchange rate begins to appreciate and both the
real and nominal trade balance gradually returns to their steady state values.
Figure 1 also shows the e®ects of the government spending shock for the \Low ERPT"
scenario (the solid black line) and the \High ERPT" (the dashed red line). The degree of
pass-through does not bring about substantial di®erences in the response of the nominal trade
balance. The largest di®erence between these two scenarios occurs initially, as the improvement
in the nominal trade (as a share of GDP) is 0.65 percentage point in the \High ERPT" scenario
19 To facilitate the comparison across di®erent shocks, the shock has been scaled to deliver a 1 percent
depreciation of the real exchange rate 4 quarters after the shock in the \Low ERPT" scenario.
23and 0.55 percentage point in the \Low ERPT". Over longer horizons, the di®erences are smaller
and there is actually more adjustment in the low pass-through environment.
These small di®erences for the two extreme scenarios mainly re°ect two opposing forces. On
the one hand, low pass-through tends to mute the sensitivity of the real economy and domestic
absorption to exchange rate changes. This e®ect is most visible initially in which there is a much
larger fall in absorption in the high pass-through scenario than in the low pass-through scenario.
This larger fall in absorption accounts for the greater initial trade balance improvement in the
\High ERPT" scenario. On the other hand, a low pass-through environment ampli¯es the real
exchange rate depreciation following the shock and this e®ect tends to contribute to greater
nominal adjustment, helping account for the slightly higher adjustment of the trade balance
over longer horizons in the low pass-through scenario.
Table 5 shows the response of the nominal trade balance to a monetary expansion and the
aggregate technology shock in addition to the government spending shock discussed earlier.20
The insensitivity of the trade balance to alternative pass-through assumptions does not appear
to be shock speci¯c. While the monetary shock, for example, can induce very di®erent real trade
responses in a low pass-through environment than a high pass-through environment, there is
very little di®erence in the response of the nominal trade balance for each of these shocks.
4.2.1 Comparison to Obstfeld and Rogo® (2004)
In a series of in°uential papers, Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000b) and Obstfeld and Rogo® (2004)
have argued that the turnaround of the U.S. trade de¯cit could have dramatic consequences
for the real exchange rate and the U.S. economy more broadly. Their analyses were based on
simple but fairly representative open-economy models in which there is full pass-through of
exchange rate changes to import prices. Although they never formal incorporate features into
their model consistent with incomplete pass-through, they conjecture that the size of the dollar
20 To facilitate the comparison across scenarios and di®erent shocks, each shock has been scaled to deliver a 1
percent depreciation of the real exchange rate 4 quarters after the shock in the \Low ERPT" scenarios. For the
monetary shock, we add a shock to equation (42) that is a ¯rst-order autoregressive process with a coe±cient
equal to 0.8.
24depreciation would be twice as large in an economy in which pass-through is only 50 percent.
Can we reconcile our results with this conjecture? Our results suggest that nominal ad-
justment in a low pass-through and high pass-through environment is similar for a given-sized
shock. Thus, to reduce the trade de¯cit by 1 percentage point, the magnitude of a particular
shock would be comparable in a high and low pass-through environment. However, the un-
derlying forces that bring about nominal adjustment are very di®erent. In particular, a low
pass-through environment is associated with greater movements in the nominal exchange rate,
and thus, our results are broadly consistent with the OR conjecture. To see this, consider the
government spending shock in Table 5. In this case, for a 1 percentage point improvement in
the trade balance to occur after 4 quarters, the real exchange rate needs to depreciate slightly
more than 1 percent in the \High ERPT" scenario. In comparison, the real exchange rate must
depreciate about 2 percent in the \Low ERPT" scenario to induce the same amount of nominal
adjustment.
4.2.2 Sources of Pass-Through and External Adjustment
Our benchmark model encompasses two di®erent sources that account for incomplete pass-
through at the dock: local currency pricing and a variable demand elasticity. Table 1 docu-
ments that abstracting from either variable demand elasticities (VES), shown by the column
labeled \LCP/CES Demand", or from local currency pricing, shown by the column labeled \No
LCP/VES Demand", implies that import price pass-through at both high and low frequencies
is too high high relative to observed pass-through.21 Still, a natural question to ask is whether
our results regarding the relationship between pass-through at the dock and the trade balance
is robust to alternative calibrations of these two sources of low pass-through. Table 6 shows
the trade balance response following a government spending shock for local currency pricing
with CES demand curves (labeled \LCP/CES Demand") and no local currency pricing with
21 In these alternatives, we did not re-estimate the model. If, instead, we re-estimate the model in the
\LCP/CES Demand" case, the average contract duration rises to 5 quarters. This re-estimated model is able
to match the high frequency responsiveness of import prices to the exchange rate but still implies too much
pass-through at lower frequencies.
25VES demand curves (labeled \No LCP/VES Demand"). In addition, we also consider an al-
ternative with local currency pricing in which the average contract duration is four quarters
(labeled \4-qtr. LCP/VES Demand") instead of two quarters to be consistent with the esti-
mates of Gopinath and Rigobon (2006). As shown there, the nominal trade balance response
in the \Low ERPT" scenario is roughly equivalent to the \High ERPT" scenario, regardless of
whether low pass-through is accounted for mainly by local currency pricing or variable demand
elasticities.
A third source of incomplete pass-through is the presence of distribution services intensive
in local goods, which mutes the responsiveness of the retail price of imports to exchange rate
changes. To highlight the role of distribution services, Table 6 allows us to compare the bench-
mark scenario (´ = 1) to the case of a smaller distribution sector (´ = 0:5).22 This comparison
suggests that lower pass-through to retail import prices via a larger distribution sector is as-
sociated with less trade adjustment than when there is the high pass-through to retail import
prices; however, the di®erence is small. For instance, the nominal trade balance in the bench-
mark case with low pass-through at the dock (labeled Benchmark - Low ERPT) increases 0.42
percentage point 4 quarters after a government spending shock, and 0.44 percentage point when
the distribution sector is smaller and pass-through to retail import prices is higher.
4.2.3 Decomposition of the Nominal Trade Balance
Our main ¯nding is that the extent of pass-through does not signi¯cantly alter the response of
the nominal trade balance to shocks. However, the forces underlying nominal trade adjustment
can be very di®erent in a high and low pass-through environment. To understand this result
better, it is instructive to use a ¯rst-order approximation to decompose the movements in the
nominal trade balance:




Ht ¡ ^ tott ¡ ^ AFt
´
; (43)
22 In the experiment with ´ = 0:5, we increased Á so that the the economy's trade share and relative size of
the non-traded sector remained the same as in our benchmark.
26where tbt is the ratio of the nominal trade balance to nominal output, and ¹ m denotes the steady
state ratio of nominal imports to nominal output. Also, ^ tott = ^ pFt ¡ ^ p¤
Ht ¡ ^ qt denotes the log
deviation of the terms of trade from steady state de¯ned using ^ p¤
Ht, the home export price in
foreign currency units relative to the foreign consumer price de°ator and qt, the real exchange
rate. We can express real imports as:
^ AFt = ¡²T ^ pFt + ^ At + 't; (44)
and de¯ne an analogous expression for real exports. In equation (44), 't = (²T ¡
1+½a
½a )^ pTt,
where ^ pTt denotes the wholesale price of the traded good relative to the consumer price level
so that in general real imports directly re°ect changes in the price of traded goods relative to
non-traded goods.
Substituting in the expressions for real exports, imports, and the terms of trade, movements
in the trade balance can be decomposed as:
tbt = ¹ m
h
²T(^ pFt ¡ ^ p
¤
Ht) ¡ (^ pFt ¡ ^ p
¤
Ht ¡ qt) + ^ A
¤





Equation (45) highlights the critical role that the elasticity of substitution ²T plays in our
analysis. For the benchmark version of our model, 't ¼ 0 and '¤
t ¼ 0 because ²T ¼
1+½a
½a .
Accordingly, changes in the relative price of tradables to non-tradables only have a small direct
impact on the nominal trade balance. More notably, with ²T < 1, as implied by our benchmark
estimate, a given amount of real exchange rate depreciation will be associated with more trade
adjustment in the \Low ERPT" scenario than in the \High ERPT" scenario, holding domestic
and foreign absorption constant. This result re°ects that low pass-through limits the increase
in pFt ¡ p¤
Ht associated with the depreciation, which translates into a smaller terms of trade
deterioration or even a terms of trade improvement if pass-through is low enough. With ²T < 1,
the e®ect of low pass-through on movements in the terms of trade outweighs the e®ect that low
pass-through has on real trade adjustment via changes in relative prices, pFt ¡ p¤
Ht. If ²T > 1,
however, the relative price e®ect on real trade dominates the terms of trade e®ect and we get
the opposite result: holding home and foreign absorption constant, a given real depreciation
would induce more adjustment in the \High ERPT" scenario.
274.3 Sensitivity to the Trade Price Elasticity
To illustrate the importance of ²T, Figure 2 shows the e®ects of the government spending
shock for ²T = 8. Such a value is within the range of estimates coming from studies of trade
liberalizations but well above our benchmark estimate. In this case, there is much less nominal
adjustment in the \Low ERPT" scenario than the \High ERPT" scenario, re°ecting that
incomplete pass-through limits expenditure switching e®ects associated with movements in
relative trade prices and reduces the sensitivity of absorption to exchange rate changes. The
nominal trade balance rises about 1 percentage point on impact in the low pass-through world
compared to the 2.5 percentage points increase in the high pass-through world.
However, as shown in Table 1 under the column labeled \High Elasticity", such a high
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods implies that real imports are overly
sensitive to movements in import prices both in the short and long run. Moreover, Table 2
shows that the volatility of the real exchange rate and terms of trade are much lower than for
the benchmark estimates and relative to the data.
To address the concerns, a number of authors such as Ruhl (2005) and Ramanarayanan
(2007) have developed micro-founded frictions that allow for a low substitutability of home
and foreign goods in the short run and high substitutability in the long run. To capture such
frictions, we follow Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) and Engel and Wang (2007) and assume
that there are costs for adjusting imports. Since incorporating these adjustment costs with a
Kimball-type aggregator considerably complicates the analysis, we abstract from variations in
desired markups (i.e., º = ª = 0) as a source of low pass-through to import prices and specify












In equation (46), AHt and AFt are themselves aggregates of the individual domestic and foreign
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With this speci¯cation, the long-run elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
is given by ²T =
½
½¡°, while the elasticity of substitution in the short or medium run is in°uenced
by the adjustment cost parameter, '.
To assess the implications of the model with adjustment costs, we chose ', ½Z and ¾Z
to match the moments used to measure pass-through, the responsiveness of U.S. imports to
import prices, and output volatility and persistence. Since we abstract from the variable demand
elasticity, we increase the average contract duration of foreign export prices from our benchmark
estimate of 2 quarters (µF = 0:5) to 4 quarters (µF = 0:75). Finally, we set ²T = 8 and choose
the remaining parameter values to be the same as in the benchmark case.
Tables 1 and 2 under the column labeled \Adjust. Cost" shows that this model ¯ts the
data reasonably well. In particular, the model matches the responsiveness of U.S. imports to
import prices at both high and low frequencies and implies somewhat greater exchange rate
volatility than the benchmark case. The main shortcoming of the adjustment cost model is
that it implies too much pass-through at longer horizons, which is not surprising, since we have
abstracted from variations in desired markups.
Figure 3 shows the response of the trade balance to the government spending shock for the
model with adjustment costs on trade. The nominal trade balance is roughly the same in the
\Low ERPT" and \High ERPT" scenarios, re°ecting that the adjustment costs imply a much
lower e®ective elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods at relevant horizons
than ²T = 8.
4.4 Sensitivity to the Monetary Policy Rule
Because the endogenous reaction of monetary policy can a®ect the transmission of shocks to the
real exchange rate, the terms of trade, and absorption, it can impact the response of the trade
balance in high and low pass-through environments. To assess the sensitivity of our results to
29alternative monetary policy rules, we ¯rst consider an interest-rate rule that puts some weight
on exchange-rate stabilization. In this case, we modify the central bank's policy rule as follows:
^ {t = °¼^ ¼t + °y^ yt + °e¢b et; (48)
where ¢b et refers to the log-change of the nominal exchange rate. There is little evidence that
the Federal Reserve puts weight on the exchange rate in its reaction function. Still, Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007) ¯nd evidence that a number of central banks such as the Bank of Canada and
the Bank of England respond to exchange rate movements. We set °e = 0:5, which is somewhat
higher than their point estimates, and used our benchmark model to evaluate the sensitivity to
this change in the monetary policy rule. Table 7 shows that following a decrease in government
spending, the response of the nominal trade balance is similar in the \Low ERPT" and \High
ERPT" scenarios. More generally, Table 7 suggests that monetary policy is not the principle
driver of our main results. In particular, when we consider a world economy with °exible prices,
we continue to ¯nd little change in the responsiveness of the nominal trade balance for di®erent
pass-through environments.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an open economy DGE model with incomplete exchange rate pass-
through to trade prices. We used this model to look intensively at the relationship between
exchange rate pass-through and external adjustment.
An important implication of a low pass-through world is that real economic variables |
including absorption and real exports and imports | tend to respond less to shocks. This
re°ects the fact that with low pass-through foreign exporters absorb a portion of the shock into
their margins. This tends to attenuate adjustment of the nominal trade balance. However, the
exchange rate tends to move more in response to shocks in a low pass-through environment,
which induces greater nominal adjustment. For reasonable values of the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods, these two e®ects o®set, and the amount of nominal adjustment
30is largely independent of the extent of exchange-rate pass-through. Thus, to reduce the trade
de¯cit by 1 percentage point, the magnitude of a particular shock would be comparable in a
high and low pass-through environment.
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35Table 1: Trade Statisticsa;b
No High Adjust.
Moments Data Benchmark Low ERPT CES LCP Elasticity Cost
High Frequency Moments:
¯H(pF;q) 0.29 0.29 0.17 0.78 1.12 0.21 0.27
(0.05)
¯H(p¤




A ) -0.28 -0.65 -0.66 -0.67 -0.67 -4.69 -0.18
(0.18)
Low Frequency Moments:
¯L(pF;q) 0.58 0.58 0.54 1.08 0.71 0.36 0.80
(0.06)
¯L(p¤




A ) -0.61 -0.62 -0.65 -0.67 -0.64 -2.08 -0.56
(0.21)
aEntries denote statistics based on U.S. data and di®erent versions of our model at di®erent frequencies. The
superscript \H" denotes the statistic at periodicities of 2 to 8 quarters, and the superscript \L" denotes the
statistic at periodicities of 20 to 40 quarters. Standard errors for the data are reported in parenthesis.
bThe statistic ¯(y;x) denotes the correlation between x and y, ½(y;x), multiplied by the standard deviation of
y relative to the standard deviation of x,
¾y
¾x (i.e., ¯(y;x) = ½(y;x)
¾y
¾x.)
36Table 2: Business Cycle Statisticsa;b
No High Adjust.
Moments Data Benchmark Low ERPT CES LCP Elasticity Cost
¾Y 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.35 1.59 1.42 1.31
(0.21)
¾TB=Y 0.37 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.24 0.17
(0.03)
¾C=¾Y 0.54 0.66 0.70 0.59 0.52 0.63 0.58
(0.12)
¾I=¾Y 3.62 2.24 2.27 2.09 3.22 2.19 2.58
(0.68)
¾q=¾Y 2.69 1.59 1.65 1.60 1.23 0.37 1.97
(0.61)
¾TOT=¾q 0.74 0.52 0.61 1.13 0.89 0.16 0.77
(0.14)
Correlations:
½(TOT;q) 0.34 0.91 -0.42 0.98 0.93 0.91 0.78
(0.19)
½(Y;Y¡1) 0.94 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.90
(0.31)
¯(¼;q) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.01)
aEntries denote statistics based on U.S. data and di®erent versions of our model at business cycle frequencies
(i.e., periodicities between 6 and 32 quarters).
bThe statistic ¯(y;x) denotes the correlation between x and y, ½(y;x), multiplied by the standard deviation of
y relative to the standard deviation of x,
¾y
¾x (i.e., ¯(y;x) = ½(y;x)
¾y
¾x.)
37Table 3: Estimated Parameter Values¤
ª = 0:846 µF = 0:503
²T = 0:785 ½Z = 0:99
¾Z = 0:012
¤Estimates imply a value of ½ = 0:77, º = 4:60, and ° = 1:05
given a calibrated value of ¹ = 1:2.
Table 4: Calibrated Parameter Values
¯ = (1:03)¡0:25 ± = 0:025
Â = 1 ¹ = 1:2
Áb = 0:0001 ® = 0:4
1+½a
½a = 0:74 Á = 0:2
´ = 1 ! = 0:25
µN = 0:75 µH = 0:75
°¼ = 1:5 °Y = 0:125
½g = 0:98 ¾g = 0:016
g = 0:18 ¹ = 1:2
38Table 5: Response of Trade Prices and Quantities for Alternative Shocksa;b
Real Real Terms Nominal Trade
Exchange Rate Absorption Trade of Trade (% of GDP)
Government Spending
Decrease
High ERPT 0.41 -2.93 3.95 0.50 0.36
Benchmark 0.66 -2.98 4.13 0.43 0.38
Low ERPT 1.00 -3.03 4.44 0.35 0.42
Monetary Expansion
High ERPT 0.58 1.41 -0.49 0.65 -0.12
Benchmark 0.64 1.54 -0.88 0.25 -0.12
Low ERPT 1.00 1.68 -2.44 -1.57 -0.09
Aggregate Technology
Increase
High ERPT 0.95 0.68 0.78 1.05 -0.03
Benchmark 0.97 0.71 0.43 0.60 -0.02
Low ERPT 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.05 -0.01
aEntries refer to the response of each variable after 4 quarters. All variables except the nominal trade balance
are expressed as a percent deviation from steady state. Real trade de¯ned as the ratio of real exports to real
imports. The nominal trade balance is expressed as a ratio to nominal output, and the units denote
percentage point deviation from steady state.
bThe shock is calibrated to induce a 1 percent depreciation in the real exchange rate after 4 quarters in the
benchmark case of the Low ERPT scenario.
cHigh ERPT refers to the scenario in which home and foreign producers practice producer currency pricing,
and Low ERPT refers to the scenario in which home and foreign producers price to market.
39Table 6: Response of Trade Balance to a Government Spending Shock under Alternative ERPT
Assumptionsa;b
Real Real Terms Nominal Trade
Exchange Rate Absorption Trade of Trade (% of GDP)
Benchmark
High ERPT 0.41 -2.93 3.95 0.50 0.36
Low ERPT 1.00 -3.03 4.44 0.35 0.42
LCP/CES Demand
High ERPT 0.41 -2.79 3.80 0.51 0.34
Low ERPT 0.43 -2.81 3.89 0.58 0.34
No LCP/VES Demand
High ERPT 0.41 -2.93 3.95 0.50 0.36
Low ERPT 0.92 -2.83 4.15 0.58 0.37
4-Qtr. LCP/VES Demand
High ERPT 0.41 -2.93 3.95 0.50 0.36
Low ERPT 1.19 -2.88 3.71 -0.48 0.43
Smaller Distribution
High ERPT 0.67 -2.98 4.46 0.79 0.38
Low ERPT 1.15 -3.04 4.65 0.37 0.44
aEntries refer to the response of each variable after 4 quarters. All variables except the nominal trade balance
are expressed as a percent deviation from steady state. Real trade de¯ned as the ratio of real exports to real
imports. The nominal trade balance is expressed as a ratio to nominal output, and the units denote
percentage point deviation from steady state. bThe shock is calibrated to induce a 1 percent depreciation in
the real exchange rate after 4 quarters in the benchmark case of the Low ERPT scenario.
cHigh ERPT refers to the scenario in which home and foreign producers practice producer currency pricing,
and Low ERPT refers to the scenario in which home and foreign producers price to market.
40Table 7: Response of Trade Balance to a Government Spending Shock under Alternative Mon-
etary Policiesa;b
Real Real Terms Nominal Trade
Exchange Rate Absorption Trade of Trade (% of GDP)
Benchmark/Taylor Rule
High ERPT 0.15 -4.15 4.93 0.23 0.49
Low ERPT 1.00 -4.25 6.07 0.79 0.55
Rule with exchange rate
High ERPT 0.09 -4.00 4.54 0.15 0.45
Low ERPT 0.71 -4.03 5.09 0.27 0.50
Flexible Price Model
High ERPT 0.57 -3.93 5.08 0.52 0.47
Low ERPT 1.39 -3.96 5.74 0.65 0.53
aEntries refer to the response of each variable after 4 quarters. All variables except the nominal trade balance
are expressed as a percent deviation from steady state. Real trade de¯ned as the ratio of real exports to real
imports. The nominal trade balance is expressed as a ratio to nominal output, and the units denote
percentage point deviation from steady state.
bThe shock is calibrated to induce a 1 percent depreciation in the real exchange rate after 4 quarters in the
benchmark case of the Low ERPT scenario.
cHigh ERPT refers to the scenario in which home and foreign producers practice producer currency pricing,
and Low ERPT refers to the scenario in which home and foreign producers price to market.
41Figure 1: Response to a Decrease in Government Spending
(Deviation from Steady State)
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42Figure 2: Response to a Decrease in Government Spending
High Elasticity of Substitution Between Home and Foreign Goods
(Deviation from Steady State)
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43Figure 3: Response to a Decrease in Government Spending
Model with Trade Adjustment Costs
(Deviation from Steady State)
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